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The Power Allocation Game on A Network: A Paradox
Yuke Li, and A. Stephen Morse
Abstract—The well-known Braess paradox in congestion
games states that adding an additional road to a transportation
network may increase the total travel time, and consequently
decrease the overall efficiency. Motivated by this, this paper
presents a paradox in a similar spirit emerging from another
distributed resource allocation game on networks, namely the
power allocation game between countries developed in [1].
The paradox is that by having additional friends may actually
decrease a country’s total welfare in equilibrium. Conditions
for this paradox to occur as well as some price of anarchy
results are also derived.
Index Terms—paradox, utility, price of anarchy, resource
allocation game
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1969, a paradoxical example was presented in [2],
demonstrating that due to selfish behaviors of agents, a
measure aimed to increase the efficiency of a transportation
network may produce counter-productive effects. Specifi-
cally, it was shown that adding a new route to the trans-
portation network can increase the total travel time therein.
The concept of price of anarchy [3] was naturally adopted to
measure the extent of inefficiency caused by agents’ behavior
of selfish routing in [4]–[9]. For example, [6] obtains lower
and upper bounds for the price of anarchy in the congestion
game on any transportation network. An optimal network
design problem was then formulated and extensively studied
in [10]–[18], where the motivation behind this problem
was the potential interest of policy makers in designing a
transportation network with the goal of minimizing the price
of anarchy involved.
This paper proposes a similar paradox that arises in
another distributed, resource allocation game on networks,
where countries “allocate” their power among their friends
and adversaries, namely the power allocation game (PAG).
This is a distributed, resource allocation game on a signed
graph. [19]
This paper focuses on the analysis of the paradox by
examining the case of a loss in welfare countries may suffer
due to certain changes in the networked environment that
was supposed to increase its utility. For example, having
additional friends in the environment may prevent a country
from achieving its optimal welfare.
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Obviously, an utility function is needed to the definition of
countries’ “welfare” from power allocation and to the intro-
duction of the paradox; a certain family of utility functions
that satisfy the two axioms that model countries’ preferences
for the “power allocation matrices” in [1] and [20] will be
introduced and used throughout the paper.
The paper is structured as the following. In Section II, the
set up of the PAG is reviewed, along with a discussion of a
family of utility functions to model countries’ preferences for
“power allocation matrices”, and a paradox is identified. In
Section III, conditions for this paradox to occur are derived.
The paper concludes with a discussion of the upper and lower
bounds for the price of anarchy in the power allocation game
in a general networked environment.
II. THE PAG AND THE PARADOX
A. Basic Idea
By the power allocation game or PAG is meant a dis-
tributed resource allocation game between n countries with
labels in n = {1, 2, . . . , n} [1]. The game is formulated on a
simple, undirected, signed graph G called “an environment
graph” [20] whose n vertices correspond to the countries and
whosem edges represent relationships between countries. An
edge between distinct vertices i and j, denoted by (i, j), is
labeled with a plus sign if countries i an j are friends and
with a minus sign if countries i and j are adversaries. For
each i ∈ n, Fi and Ai denote the sets of labels of country
i’s friends and adversaries respectively; it is assumed that
i ∈ Fi and that Fi and Ai are disjoint sets. Each country
i possesses a nonnegative quantity pi called the total power
of country i. An allocation of this power or strategy is a
nonnegative n× 1 row vector ui whose j component uij is
that part of pi which country i allocates under the strategy
to either support country j if j ∈ Fi or to demise country
j if j ∈ Ai; accordingly uij = 0 if j 6∈ Fi ∪ Ai. The goal
of the game is for each country to choose a strategy which
contributes to the demise of all of its adversaries and to the
support of all of its friends.
Each set of country strategies {ui, i ∈ n} determines an
n× n matrix U whose ith row is ui. Thus U = [uij ]n×n is
a nonnegative matrix such that, for each i ∈ n, ui1 + ui2 +
· · ·+ uin = pi. Any such matrix is called a strategy matrix
and U is the set of all n× n strategy matrices.
B. Multi-front Pursuit of Survival
In [1] and [20], how countries allocate their power in
the support of the survival of its friends and the demise
of that of its adversaries is studied, which is in line with
the fundamental assumptions about countries’ behavior in
classical international relations theory. [21] These facts are
accounted for by the following additional formulations:
Each strategy matrix U determines for each i ∈ n, the
total support σi(U) of country i and the total threat τi(U)
against country i. Here σi : U → IR and τi : U → IR are
non-negative valued maps defined by U 7−→
∑
j∈Fi
uji +∑
j∈Ai
uij and U 7−→
∑
j∈Ai
uji respectively. Thus country
i’s total support is the sum of the amounts of power each of
country i’s friends allocate to its support plus the sum of the
amounts of power country i allocates to the destruction of all
of its adversaries. Country i’s total threat, on the other hand,
is the sum of the amounts of power country i’s adversaries
allocate to its demise. These allocations in turn determine
country i’s state xi(U) which may be safe, precarious, or
unsafe depending on the relative values of σi(U) and τi(U).
In particular, xi(U) = safe if σi(U) > τi(U), xi(U) =
precarious if σi(U) = τi(U), or xi(U) = unsafe if σi(U) <
τi(U).
In playing the PAG, countries select individual strategies
in accordance with certain weak and/or strong preferences.
A sufficient set of conditions for country i to weakly prefer
strategy matrix V ∈ U over strategy matrix U ∈ U are as
follows
1) For all j ∈ Fi either xj(V ) ∈ {safe, precarious}, or
xj(U) = unsafe, or both.
2) For all j ∈ Ai either xj(V ) ∈ {unsafe, precarious},
or xj(U) = safe, or both.
Weak preference by country i of V over U is denoted by
U  V .
Meanwhile, a sufficient condition for country i to be
indifferent to the choice between V and U is that xi(U) =
xj(V ) for all j ∈ Fi ∪ Ai. This is denoted by V ∼ U .
Finally, a sufficient condition for country i to strongly
prefer V over U is that xi(V ) be a safe or precarious state
and xi(U) be an unsafe state. Strong preference by country
i of V over U is denoted by U ≺ V .
C. Preferences: Utility function representation
A country i will derive a certain amount of utility or
welfare from a strategy profile of the PAG assuming a
certain networked environment; let i’s utility be a function
fi : U −→ R. A family of utility functions with the
following three properties satisfies the two preference axioms
and makes possible a total order of the power allocation
matrices in U . For more details about how this is achieved,
please refer to [22].
1) Country i receives a two-valued pairwise utility from
each of its friends and adversaries, tij(xj(U)). The
specific values of the pairwise utilities can be regarded
as proxies of the relative importances attached to each
friend and adversary relation.
Pairwise utility tij : {safe, precarious, unsafe} −→
{tij(1), tij(0)} where tij(1) ≥ tij(0). tij(1), tij(0) ∈
R is defined as follows.
If j ∈ Fi, tij(1) and tij(0) respectively stands for
i’s pairwise utility from j when σj(U) ≥ τj(U) and
σj(U) < τj(U);
If j ∈ Ai, tij(1) and tij(0) respectively stands for
i’s pairwise utility from j when σj(U) ≤ τj(U) and
σj(U) > τj(U).
2) Country i’s total utility fi(U) will only be equal to t
0
ii
if it has not survived itself.
3) Once country i has survived, its total utility fi(U) >
t0ii, and will be a nondecreasing function of tij(xj(U))
for any j ∈ Fi ∪ Ai.
For simplicity, this paper’s focus is on a subset of utility
functions in this family; for any utility function in this
subset, its maximum is attained only when all its friends are
safe/precarious, and all its adversaries are unsafe/precarious.
After country i’s self-survival threshold is fulfilled, the
function fi(U) exhibits a jump discontinuity. Let the set
of i’s friends who are safe/precarious under U be F1i (U)
and the set of i’s adversaries who are unsafe/precarious be
A1i (U). An example is
fi(U) =
{
tii(0) xi(U) = unsafe∑
i∈F1
i
(U)∪A1
i
(U) tij(1) xi(U) ∈ {safe, precarious}
Some functions in this family may exhibit more jump
discontinuities; for instance, countries may additionally pri-
oritize the survival of some friends. An utility function where
country i prioritizes the survival of all its friends before
demising the survival of all its adversaries is below:
fi(U) =


tii(0) xi(U) = unsafe∑
j∈F1
i
(U) tij(1) xi(U) ∈ {safe, precarious}∑
i∈F1
i
(U)∪A1
i
(U) tij(1) xi(U) ∈ {safe, precarious},
∀j ∈ Fi
D. Definition: A Paradox
Let country i’s optimal welfare from power allocation be
the maximum utility i can derive from a power allocation
matrix U ∈ U . Denote it as
f∗i (U)
Since country i’s optimal welfare from power allocation
must differ by environments, we define a pairwise utility i
receives from having every other country j (other than i) for
each of the following four conditions:
1) tFij(1): j ∈ Fi and xj(U) ∈ {safe, precarious}.
2) tFij(0): j ∈ Fi and xj(U) = unsafe.
3) tAij(1): j ∈ Ai and xj(U) ∈ {unsafe, precarious}.
4) tAij(0): j ∈ Ai and xj(U) = safe.
Let the two environments be with the same set of countries
and one difference between the environments is that for
country i, Fi ⊂ F i. A paradox is said to occur if given
two PAGs Γ and Γ, country i can obtain a higher optimal
welfare from the former where it has fewer friends.
Example 1: The following will illustrate an example of a
paradox, which further motivates the main results in Section
III. The parameters of the first environment in Figure 1(a)
is:
1) Set of countries: n = {1, 2, 3}.
2) Their power: p = [8 6 1].
3) Their relations are: r(1, 2) = adversary, and r(2, 3) =
r(1, 3) = friend.
The parameters of the second environment in Figure 1(b) is:
1) Set of countries: n = {1, 2, 3}.
2) Their power: p = [8 6 1].
3) Their relations are: r(1, 2) = r(2, 3) = adversary, and
r(1, 3) = friend.
In the first environment, country 3 has a friend relation
with both country 1 and country 2, which are adversaries.
Any pure strategy Nash equilibrium from the PAG in this
environment will predict country 1 to be safe, country 2 to
be unsafe/precarious, and country 3 to be safe. If country 3’s
utility from having country 2 as a safe/precarious friend is
lower than having it as an unsafe/precarious adversary
tF32(1) < t
A
32(1),
it will prefer the second environment where it turns against
country 2 with country 1 and gains a higher optimal wel-
fare (with country 2 being unsafe/precarious and countries
1 and 3 being safe in any equilibrium). By assumption,
tF32(1) ≤ t
F
32(1). Therefore, country 3’s optimal welfare in
the first environment is always lower than that in the second
environment, which constitutes the paradox.
III. MAIN RESULTS
This section presents results on the conditions for the
stated paradox to occur. In particular, the conditions involve
a comparison of the roles of friends in a country’s survival
and, after the self-survival is fulfilled, in its attainment of its
optimal welfare.
Theorem 1: If a country can survive in the equilibria of
the PAG assuming a certain networked international environ-
ment, then it can survive in the equilibria of another PAG
assuming an environment with additional friends than before,
but not vice versa.
Let two PAGs be Γ and Γ, where the only difference
between the two environments is that for a country i Fi ⊂
F i. If ∀U
∗ ∈ U∗, xi(U
∗) ∈ {safe, precarious}, then it must
be that ∀U
∗
∈ U
∗
, xi(U
∗
) ∈ {safe, precarious}.
Proof of Theorem 1: In Γ, if for a country i, ∀U∗ ∈ U∗,
xi(U
∗) ∈ {safe, precarious}, by definition∑
j∈Fi
u∗ji +
∑
j∈Ai
u∗ij ≥
∑
j∈Ai
u∗ji.
Given that Fi ⊂ F i, any equilibrium allocations in the
two games satisfy the following:∑
j∈Fi
u∗ji +
∑
j∈Ai
u∗ij ≥
∑
j∈Fi
u∗ji +
∑
j∈Ai
u∗ij
and ∑
j∈Fi
u∗ji +
∑
j∈Ai
u∗ij ≥ sup{τi(U
∗) : U∗ ∈ U∗}.
Note that
sup{τi(U
∗) : U∗ ∈ U∗} = sup{τi(U
∗
) : U
∗
∈ U
∗
},
because the only difference between the two environments
lies in the number of i’s friends.
Therefore, in any equilibrium U
∗
∈ U
∗
of Γ, it must also
be that ∑
j∈Fi
u∗ji +
∑
j∈Ai
u∗ij ≥
∑
j∈Ai
u∗ji.
In other words, i must also survive in any equilibrium in
the game Γ with more friends in the new environment.

Remark 1: The existence of multiple equilibria in the PAG
is the reason in Theorem 1 for the comparison between
two games, in all of whose equilibria country i survives.
Intuitively, the reverse of Theorem 1 may not be true, with
the logic being that country i may not gather the level
of support in the previous environment to survive in a
new environment with some of its former friends becoming
nonexistent. Theorem 1 also holds in the case where country
i has some of the former adversaries turn nonexistent or new
friends, which means when Fi ⊂ F i and Ai ⊂ Ai hold.
Next a necessary condition and a sufficient condition will
respectively be provided that a country may achieve a lower
optimal welfare in the equilibria of the power allocation
game in a new networked environment with more friends
than in the previous environment.
Theorem 2 (Necessary Condition): A necessary condition
for the above stated paradox to occur is that there exists at
least a country which derives a higher utility from having
another country as an unsafe/precarious adversary than as a
unsafe friend.
Given two games Γ and Γ, the only difference between
the two underlying environments is Fi ⊂ F i. If there exists
country i ∈ n, f∗i (U) > f
∗
i (U), then there must exist country
j 6= i such that tFij(0) < t
A
ij(1).
Proof of Theorem 2: Suppose to the contrary. That is to
say, for any country i, tFij(0) ≥ t
A
ij(1), j 6= i, which
means that for any country i the utility of having any other
country as an unsafe friend exceeds that of having it as an
unsafe/precarious adversary.
Given a random environment, let the optimal welfare coun-
try i can obtain from the PAG Γ assuming this environment
be f∗i (U).
Let an alternative environment be Γ be such that the
only difference from Γ is that Fi ⊂ F i. Let the optimal
welfare country i can obtain from the PAG Γ assuming this
environment be f
∗
i (U)
Then there must hold
f∗i (U) > f
∗
i (U)
because for any of i’s new friends j, even when xj(U) ∈
{unsafe, precarious}, tFij(0) ≥ t
A
ij(1).
Then i’s having more friends will not decrease its optimal
welfare from power allocation.
Therefore, in order to the stated paradox to occur, there
must exist another country j 6= i such that tFij(0) < t
A
ij(1).

Theorem 3 (Sufficient Condition): A sufficient condition
for the stated paradox to occur is that there exists at least a
country which derives a higher utility from having another
as an unsafe/precarious adversary than as a safe/precarious
friend and the total power of these two countries is smaller
than that of all other countries in the environment.
For country i ∈ n, suppose that there exists another
country j 6= i such that tAij(1) > t
F
ij(1), and that pi + pj ≤∑
k∈n−{i,j}
pi. Then there can be constructed two different
environments in which the PAG takes place Γ and Γ where
the only difference between the environments is that for a
country i Fi ⊂ F i. The stated paradox will then occur for
country i as it switches from Γ to Γ, which means that
f∗i (U
∗) < f
∗
i (U
∗
).
Proof of Theorem 3: Let the environment of the PAG Γ be
such that all countries other than i are adversaries with j. i
is a friend with all of the other countries including j. And
let the environment of the PAG Γ be such that where all
countries are adversaries with j, and i is a friend with all of
the other countries excluding j.
Since
pi + pj ≤
∑
k∈n−{i,j}
pi,
there must hold that in any equilibrium U∗ ∈ U∗ of Γ,
xj(U
∗) ∈ {unsafe, precarious},
and
∀k 6= j, xk(U
∗) ∈ {safe, precarious}.
The same must hold for in any equilibrium U
∗
∈ U
∗
of Γ.
To country i, country j is an unsafe/precarious friend in
Γ and an unsafe/precarious adversary in Γ.
Since tAij(1) > t
F
ij(1) ≥ t
F
ij(0), it must be that f
∗
i (U
∗) <
f
∗
i (U
∗
), with all other pairwise utilities from other neighbors
being equal.
Therefore, having additional friends than before will de-
crease country i’s optimal welfare from power allocation.

Theorem 3 extends to the case where a country may have
a subset of countries in the environment, each of which
satisfies the stated condition. Thus Corollary 1 immediately
follows. Then when the conditions in Corollary holds, having
more friends from this subset will only decrease its optimal
welfare from power allocation for a country.
Corollary 1: If there exists at least a country which de-
rives a higher utility from having any other in a subset of
countries (which it is not a member of) as an unsafe/precar-
ious foe than as a safe/precarious friend and the total power
of this country and those in the subset is smaller than that
of all other countries in the environment, the stated paradox
will occur.
For country i ∈ n, suppose that there exists a subset of
countries S such that i 6∈ S and for any j ∈ S, tAij(1) >
tFij(1), and that pi +
∑
j∈S
pj ≤
∑
k∈n−{i}−S
pk. Then there
exists two games assuming different environments Γ and Γ
where the only difference between the environments is that
for a country i Fi ⊂ F i, and where an U
∗ ∈ U∗ and an
U
∗
∈ U
∗
exist such that f∗i (U
∗) < f
∗
i (U
∗
).
Proof of Corollary 1: Let the environment of the PAG Γ be
such that all countries other than i are adversaries with any
country j in S. i is a friend with all of the other countries
including countries in S. Let the environment of the PAG Γ
be such that all countries are adversaries with countries in
S, and i is a friend with all of the other countries excluding
those in S.
Since
pi +
∑
j∈S
pj ≤
∑
k∈n−{i,S}
pk,
there must hold that in any equilibrium U∗ ∈ U∗ of Γ,
∀j ∈ S, xj = {unsafe,precarious},
and
∀k 6∈ S, xk ∈ {safe, precarious}.
The same must also hold in any equilibrium U
∗
∈ U
∗
of Γ.
To country i, any country j ∈ S is an unsafe/precarious
friend in Γ and an unsafe/precarious adversary in Γ.
Since ∀j ∈ S, tAij(1) > t
F
ij(1) ≥ t
F
ij(0), there holds that
f∗i (U
∗) < f
∗
i (U
∗
). Therefore, having additional friends than
before will decrease country i’s optimal welfare from power
allocation.

IV. THE PRICE OF ANARCHY RESULTS
In this section we compare the implications of different
networked international environments for the total welfare of
countries in the power allocation game, and the commonly
defined price of anarchy concept will be used for the analysis.
Definition 1 (Price of Anarchy Concept [3]):
max
U∈U
∑
i∈n
fi(U)
min
U∈U∗
∑
i∈n
fi(U
∗)
Lemma 1: In any PAG Γ, at least a country survives in
any U ∈ U . Note that this holds regardless of whether U is
an equilibrium.
In Γ, ∀U ∈ U , ∃i ∈ n such that xi(U) ∈
{safe, precarious}.
Proof of Lemma 1: The proof is by contradiction. Given an
U ∈ U , suppose that ∀i ∈ n, xi(U) = unsafe. That is to say
that,
∀i ∈ n,
∑
j∈Fi
uji +
∑
j∈Ai
uij <
∑
j∈Ai
uji.
Equivalently,
∀i ∈ n, pi −
∑
j∈Fi
uji +
∑
j∈Fi
uji <
∑
j∈Ai
uji.
Summing from 1 to n in n gives the following,∑
i∈n
pi −
∑
i∈n
(
∑
j∈Fi
uji −
∑
j∈Fi
uij) <
∑
i∈n
∑
j∈Ai
uji.
Note that,∑
i∈n
(
∑
j∈Fi
uji−
∑
j∈Fi
uij) =
∑
{i,j}∈RF
(uji−uij)+(uij−uji) = 0.
Then there holds that∑
i∈n
pi <
∑
i∈n
∑
j∈Ai
uji.
However, by each country’s total power constraint, it must
be the case that ∑
i∈n
pi ≥
∑
i∈n
∑
j∈Ai
uji.
Hence contradiction. Therefore, given an U ∈ U , there must
exist i ∈ n, xi(U) = {safe, precarious}. In other words, in
any power allocation matrix assuming any environment, it
can never be the case that there is no survivor.

Based on Lemma 1, an upper bound for the price of
anarchy in the PAG is immediate. In addition, environments
which gives an lower bound for the price of anarchy can be
constructed.
Theorem 4: In Γ,
1 ≤ PoA ≤
A
B
where
A = nsup{
∑
j∈Fi
tFij(1) +
∑
j∈Ai
tAij(1) : i ∈ n}
and
B = (n− 1)inf{tFii (0) : i ∈ n}+ inf{t
F
ii (1) : i ∈ n}.
Proof of Theorem 4: In an environment without any antag-
onism among countries, max
U∈U
∑
i∈n
f∗i (U) is achieved with all
countries allocating zero to one other. At the same time,
max
U∗∈U∗
∑
i∈n
f∗i (U
∗) is also achieved because this is obviously
an equilibrium. Therefore, in this case PoA = 1.
Obviously, there exists no lower value for PoA; otherwise,
it means that even better total welfare can be achieved in
equilibrium. However, this gives a contradiction because U∗
already achieves the optimal total welfare. 1 is tight as
a lower bound for the PAG in environments without any
adversary relations.
Now rank all the pairwise utility from not having survived
itself of all countries, tii(0), i ∈ n, nondecreasingly, and
denote the maximum as
sup{tFii (0) : i ∈ n}
and the minimum as
inf{tFii (0) : i ∈ n}.
Rank all the pairwise utilities from having survived itself
of all countries, tFii (1), i ∈ n, nondecreasingly, and denote
the maximum as
sup{tFii (1) : i ∈ n}
and the minimum as
inf{tFii (1) : i ∈ n}.
Rank the optimal welfare of all countries∑
j∈Fi
tFij(1) +
∑
j∈Ai
tAij(1), i ∈ n
nondecreasingly, and denote the highest as
sup{
∑
j∈Fi
tFij(1) +
∑
j∈Ai
tAij(1), i ∈ n}
. By Lemma 1, in any PAG, at least one country survives.
Suppose there exists a PAG where exactly one country
survives and the utility of this country is inf{tFii (1) : i ∈ n}.
Since the other countries have not survived, their utilities are
at least
inf{tFii (0) : i ∈ n}.
This then gives the upper bound PoA ≤ A
B
where
A = nsup{
∑
j∈Fi
tFij(1) +
∑
j∈Ai
tAij(1) : i ∈ n}
and
B = (n− 1)inf{tFii (0) : i ∈ n}+ inf{t
F
ii (1) : i ∈ n}.

V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper analytically studies a paradox emerging from
the PAG. Specifically, the paper shows friends may play
different roles in a country’s survival and its attainment of
optimal welfare. Much like what Example 1 has shown, a
country’s having many friends may impede the attainment
of its optimal welfare from power allocation, especially the
potential friends have conflicts among themselves.
However, paradoxes of this kind is unsurprising in a
political context. In order to win over as many allies as
possible always requires a country to straddle middle grounds
between parties with perhaps irreconcilable differences or
even conflicts. Just as the former British PM, Margaret
Thatcher, accurately put it, “standing in the middle of the
road is very dangerous; you get knocked down by the
traffic from both sides.” Especially, thinking of the current
conflictual scenarios between the United States and North
Korea, a question can perhaps be asked, should China try to
reconcile both or choose to exert pressure on one of them,
e.g., North Korea?
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